Self-Defence - A Permissible Use of Force under the U.N. Charter by Lin, Fu-Shun
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 13 
Issue 1 Fall-Winter 1963 Article 5 
Self-Defence - A Permissible Use of Force under the U.N. Charter 
Fu-Shun Lin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Fu-Shun Lin, Self-Defence - A Permissible Use of Force under the U.N. Charter, 13 DePaul L. Rev. 43 (1963) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol13/iss1/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
SELF-DEFENCE-A PERMISSIBLE USE OF FORCE
UNDER THE U.N. CHARTER
FU-SHUN LIN
PART I. THE CONCEPT OF AN "ARMED ATTACK" WITHIN THE MEANING
OF ARTICLE 51 OF THE U.N. CHARTER
HE NOTION of armed attack in its broader sense has long been
the central element in the concept of self-defence under cus-
tomary international law.' The practice of States, as one can
see from various treaties and the opinion of writers since the forma-
tion of the League, has been that acts of force, such as aggression (i.e.,
armed aggression), attack, and invasion are the main causes against
which the victim State may resort to force in self-defence.
In their replies in 1929 to the questionnaires on the right of self-
defence presented by the League, Switzerland, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Denmark and Czechoslovakia expressed their views that the right of
self-defence must be limited to cases of "illegal aggression or attack"
only.2 Similarly, in its comments on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals,
the British Government expressed its view that while the Proposals
contained no provision concerning the right of self-defence, "the
right.., would of course remain to all members if they were sudden-
ly attacked by another State."' s In the San Francisco Conference, Sub-
Committee I/i/A, which was in charge of Article 2, Paragraph 4, in
its report to Committee I/I stated that "the right of self-defence
against aggression should not be impaired or diminished." 4 Lastly, the
1 See Gonsiorowski, The Legal Meaning of the Pact for Renunciation of War, 30
AM. POL. Soc. REv. 653, 663-64, (1936); KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 60
(1952); KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 792 (1950).
2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS CONFERENCE FOR THE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
QUESTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR DAMAGE CAUSED IN THEIR TERRITORY TO THE
PERSON OR PROPERTY OF FOREIGNERS, BASES OF DISCUSSION, League Doc. V. vol. 3 at 58,
62, 126-38 (1929).
3 A Commentary on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for the Establishment of a
General International Organization, London: H.M. Stationery Office, Cmd. No. 6751,
at 5 (1944) (emphasis added).
4 See 6 U.N. CoNF. INT'L ORG. Docs. NEW YORK, LONDON: UNITED NATIONS INFORMA-
TION ORGANIZATION (hereinafter referred to as U.N.C.I.O.)" at 5 (1945-46); Doc. 739,
I/I/A/19(a) (1945). June 1, 1945.
Research Associate, Columbia University. LL.B., 1952, National Taiwan University;
L.L.M., 1957, Harvard University; J.S.D., 1962, New York University.
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concept of self-defence in the municipal legal system is also primarily
limited to cases of illegal attack or serious offence involving use of
force.'
Moreover, the underlying principles of the United Nations are that
a unilateral use of force by an individual State or group of States
should be prohibited and that international peace and security be en-
sured through collective measures taken under the authority of the
Organization. Under these principles, consequently, the resort to
force by individual States may be allowed only under exceptional
circumstances. It was thus necessary that the cause for which the vic-
tim State could resort to force in self-defence be restricted to cases of
utmost gravity, and also that the Organization, through the Security
Council, be authorized to intervene, if necessary, and review the legal-
ity of the acts which have allegedly been undertaken in self-defence.
Thus viewed it was not a surprise that the notion of armed attack
was finally introduced in Article 51 as the basic requirement for a
lawful exercise of the right of self-defence under the Charter.
Enforcement measures aside, the right of self-defence recognized in
Article 51 constitutes the only exception to the general prohibition of
the threat or use of force provided for in Article 2, Paragraph 4. As
an exceptional provision it must be construed strictly so that the gen-
eral provision will not be deprived of its proper function: exceptiones
sunt strictissimae interpretationis.
As mentioned above, one of the cardinal principles of the Charter
is that armed force shall not be used save in the common interest and,
in principle, through the collective security machinery acting under
the authority of the United Nations. Resort to force by individual
States on their own initiative constitutes a departure from this prin-
ciple. Consequently, such a resort to force shall be permitted only
under exceptional circumstances and shall be subject to strict limita-
tions.
5Art. 53 of the German Criminal Code and Art. 217 of the German Civil Code,
for example, referred to "an illegal and actual attack."
6 While the immediate reason why the term armed attack was adopted in the San
Francisco Conference has widely been believed to be unknown, it would be an error
to maintain that the term was not intended to have any particular bearing on the right
of self-defence, or that it was mentioned merely as an example. Senator Vandenberg's
original formula for Art. 51 referred to "a violation of this Charter" as the cause against
which the right of self-defence may be invoked, and this was rejected and replaced
by the present text. See MoRms, NELsoN ROCKEFELLER, A BIOGRAPHY 220 (1960).
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Is an armed attack in Article 51 limited to cases of attack or inva-
sion carried out by regular armed forces of one State against another?
It is clear that such acts of force as invasion by armed forces in the
territory of another State, attack or bombardment by the land, naval
or air forces on the territory, vessels or aircrafts of another State, and
naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State are the most
typical forms of armed attack. It is equally clear that "armed attack"
in Article 51 is not limited to these types of attack, since a State may
be attacked by other types of armed aggression than those enumerated
above, as, for example, an invasion or infiltration by armed bands.
Nor is an armed attack required to have been committed by regular
armed forces of a State against another State. This is so because the
right of self-defence is recognized primarily with a view to protecting
the victim State from an illegal use of force, and not to establishing
the international responsibility of the attacking State. This point is of
particular importance in view of the fact that in recent years irregular
armed forces, as, for example, armed bands, guerrilla forces or volun-
teers, have frequently and subtly been employed to invade or attack
another State.7
The idea that armed attack in Article 51 shall not be literally and
too narrowly construed can further be seen from the faint that unlike
the English, Spanish, Chinese and Russian text of that article, which
all speak of armed attack, the French text speaks of agression armee.5
The French text thus indicates that Article 51 does not exclude that
illegal use of force which can be considered as constituting an act of
armed aggression but does not necessarily constitute an armed attack
in its ordinary meaning. Supporting armed bands invading the terri-
tory of another State, and overthrowing the existing government or
infringing the political independence of another State through sub-
versive activities backed by the threat of force may be mentioned as
examples.
Does an armed attack require that the attacking State commit such
acts with an intention to do so? In his report to the International Law
Commission, M. Spiropoulos suggested that an aggression requires
7 SeeRbling, The Question of Defining Aggression, Symbolae Verzijl, Martinus Nij-
hoff, La Haye 314, 332 (1958).
8 The French text of Art. 51 reads "dans un cas o i un Membre des Nations Unies est
l'objet d'une agression arm .... "
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both objective and subjective elements.9 This theory has been, to a
varied degree, supported by most Western Powers, but severely at-
tacked by the Members of the Soviet bloc.'0
If the subjective element means an animus aggressionis on the part
of the attacking party, such an element cannot be accepted as a re-
quirement for an armed attack. Just as in the case of animus belli-
gerendi, an aggressor may always disclaim such an intention on its
part and thus evade its responsibility for what is actually an act of
armed attack. However, if the subjective element means, as M. Spirop-
oulos rightly pointed out, that the attacking State has acted de-
liberately and not committed the act through a genuine error, then
such an element would seem to be desirable.
This is so not because a subjective intent on the part of the offend-
ing State is legally required but because an act committed through a
genuine error is normally not serious enough to warrant the offended
State to invoke the right of self-defence. The subjective element is
relevant in the evaluation of the international responsibility of the
State which has committed an act of force in question, but is not
essential for the victim State to invoke the right of self-defence. In
most cases, an act resulting from such an error or mistake is small in
scope and causes little danger. Hence, the State responsible for it will
normally not be regarded as an aggressor."
It seems proper to say, consequently, that the question whether a
given act of force constitutes an armed attack and thus gives rise to
the right of self-defence for the victim State shall be determined by
the objective facts-acts of force, their magnitude and consequences-
in the light of each case.
Apart from the question of the subjective element of armed attack,
the concept of armed attack should also be considered from the view-
points of its qualitative and quantitative elements. Not every illegal
resort to force or act of aggression constitutes an armed attack and
9 G.A.O.R., (VI) (1951), Sixth Comm., 279th Mtg., Para. 8. Spiropoulos further
pointed out that intention is different from motive; motive is the reason for which
an act of aggression has been committed, but intention exists only when the State com-
mitting the act in question has acted deliberately.
10 For the position of U.K., see G.A.O.R., (VI) (1951), Sixth Comm., 281st Mtg.,
Para. 11; for that of Cuba, id., 285th Mtg., Para. 26; for that of Belgium, id., 287th Mtg.,
Para. 36; for that of Poland, see G.A.O.R., (IX) (1954), Sixth Comm., 406th Mtg.,
Para. 39; for that of Byelorussian S.S.R., id., 411th Mtg., Para. 15.
11 Accord, Wehberg, "L'Interdiction du recours d la force. Le Principe et les pro-
blmes qui se posent," 78 Recueil des Cours (I), 7, 75 (1951).
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justifies the victim State to resort to force in self-defence. Resort to
force in self-defence will be allowed only in case of absolute neces-
sity. It is, therefore, necessary to consider under what degree of dan-
ger and urgency should the victim State of an illegal resort to force be
entitled to resort to force in self-defence in accordance with Article
51.
Mr. Roling of the Netherlands tried to formulate this qualitative
element in the following ways: an armed attack will justify the vic-
tim State for invoking the right of self-defence only when that State's
survival was at stake; in cases where the danger was less pressing, the
victim State would still be bound to bring the matter to an appropriate
organ of the United Nations. 12 He further elaborated this idea in the
following formula: An armed attack must be of such a nature and
magnitude as to leave the victim State no room to wait for a United
Nations action, and to compel it to have no recourse other than to
resort to armed force in order to preserve its territorial integrity or
political independence."1 Thus, according to R61ing, the decisive fac-
tor for determining the gravity of an armed attack is the fact that the
attack leaves the victim State no alternative but to take up arms to
defend its territorial integrity or political independence.
While the requirement of "no choice of means" is undoubtedly one
of the most important requirements for a lawful exercise of the right
of self-defence, it is unacceptable to limit the objects of an armed
attack only to the rights of territorial integrity and political inde-
pendence. The bases for the above view are that these two rights are
the most essential ones for the very existence of a State and that
Article 2, Paragraph 4, provides, in their opinion, that the Member
States may resort to force only when necessary for protecting their
territorial integrity and political independence. 14 But there is nothing
12 G.A.O.R., (IX) (1954), Sixth Comm., 410th Mtg., Para. 39.
13 Ring explained that the phrase "no room to wait for United Nations action"
was only an attempt to find "a general criterion which might assist in determining
the circumstances when self-defence was the only means of preserving territorial in-
tegrity and political independence," and that "Time might not be the only factor
involved; the Security Council might be paralysed by the veto or some other deadlock
might preclude immediate United Nations action." REPORT OF THE 1956 SPECIAL COM-
MIVEE ON THE QUESTION OF DEFINING AGGRsiON, U.N. Doc., A/AC.77/SR. 12, 3; id.,
SR. 8, 9, and SR. 13, 17. The Report may be found in GA.O.R., (XII), Supp. No. 16,
(A/1374).
14 See the remarks of R6ling, G.A.O.R., (IX) (1954), Sixth Comm. 417th Mtg., Para.
16; that of the delegate of Egypt, see G.A.O.R., (VI) (1951), Sixth Comm. 129th Mtg.,
Para. 10.
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in the Charter which may be construed as having limited the right of
self-defence to the protection of the above-said two rights; nor does
Article 2, Paragraph 4, authorize the Member States to resort to force
if necessary for protecting these rights.
It is true that the rights of territorial integrity and political inde-
pendence are most essential for a sovereign State, and that armed
attack has in fact often been committed against these two objects. But
an armed attack will not cease to be so even though its object is some-
thing else, as, for example, against a territory under an international
control or against a substantial number of lives or property of nations
of a State residing abroad.15
This limitation, however, has gained little support among the Mem-
ber States; it has been criticized or even attacked by many other dele-
gates, including those of the United States, the United Kingdom,
China and the Soviet Union, on the grounds that Article 51 does not
contain such a limitation and the right of self-defence does not require
it. 1 6
The decisive factor in this respect is not the category of the rights
to be protected, but rather the gravity and the magnitude of the dan-
ger of the act of attack (which means the necessity of self-defence
from the viewpoint of the attacked State). In the case of the Israeli
invasion of Egypt in October-November 1956, Israel argued that the
long and uninterrupted series of encroachments, consisting of infiltra-
tion and invasion in the territory of Israel by the fedayeen units from
Egypt, constituted an armed attack against Israel. The overwhelming
majority members of the General Assembly were, however, unable to
accept this interpretation of the term armed attack, because in their
view such infiltration or raids on the part of the fedayeen units,
though illegal, were not of such a serious nature or on such a large
15 Art. 9 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance provides that an
unprovoked attack against the people or the land, sea, or air forces of another State
should be characterized as aggression.
16 See, for example, the remarks of Hsu, the delegate of China, that there was no
reason for restricting the objects of armed attack to these two rights only. Such a
restriction was not consistent with Art. 2, Para. 4, and was illogical. G.A.O.R., (IX)
(1954), Sixth Comm., 412th Mtg., Para. 26. Similarly, the delegate of the United States
expressed doubts as to whether a State was entitled to act in self-defence only when
its territorial integrity or political independence was attacked; he pointed out that this
might seriously prejudice the right of self-defence under Art. 51. REPORT or THE 1956
SPEcIAL COMm., Op. cit. supra n. 13, SR. 13, at 4-5.
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scale as to warrant Israel to launch a large-scale attack against Egypt
in self-defence.17
In short, an act of armed attack must have seriously endangered an
essential right of the State against which it has been directed (of
these essential rights, territorial integrity and political independence
are the most typical ones), and must be of such a grave nature as to
leave the victim State no recourse, including waiting for a United Na-
tions action, but to take necessary military measures on an urgent
basis in order to defend the right in question.
Turning to the question of the quantitative element of an armed
attack, it may be asked: How many soldiers or how large a scale of an
armed attack are required for the victim State to retaliate by resort to
force in self-defence? No answer in terms of a fixed mathematical
figure can be given.
In its 1933, 1951 and 1954 draft definitions of aggression the Soviet
Union proposed that frontier incidents may not be used as a justifica-
tion for an act of aggression as defined in the proposals. To take mili-
tary measures in self-defence against an armed attack which consti-
tutes a frontier incident will, therefore, itself be regarded as an act of
aggression. This exception has severely been criticized and attacked
by most delegates from the Western bloc as well as from non-
aligned States on the grounds that a potential aggressor might provoke
a series of serious frontier incidents with impunity, and that it would
be absurd to prohibit the victim State from defending itself or to
brand it as an aggressor if it takes any military measures.1 8
With regard to Article 51, Roling said that a frontier incident of a
less serious nature and on a small scale was not covered by Article 51,
and that the parties involved will not be justified in taking military
measures in self-defence; instead, they may take such local actions as
might be necessary to contain the acts in question.' 9 From the point of
view of the right of self-defence, however, there is no juridical or
practical reason to differentiate frontier incidents from other instances
of armed attack; as the past experience shows, a frontier incident may
be as serious and dangerous as any other act of armed attack.
Nor can we accept an argument which maintains that against any
17 Wright, The Legality of Intervention Under the United Nations Charter, 51 PROC.
AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 79, 85 (1957).
18 See, for example, the position of the United Kingdom, G.A.O.R., (IX) (1954),
Sixth Comm., 416th Mtg., Para. 19, and that of the Netherlands, id., 417th Mtg., Para. 5.
19 Report of the 1956 Special Comm., op. cit. supra n. 13, SR. 12, at 4-5.
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illegal resort to force constituting an armed attack, even though on a
small scale or of little seriousness, the victim State is automatically
entitled to the right of self-defence on the ground that Article 51
does not require the conditions of necessity or proportionateness.
The question must be considered from the point of view of the
quantitative element of an armed attack, without regard to whether
the attack takes place on a frontier or somewhere else. The question
is, therefore, of a general nature; it is whether the scale or magnitude
of an act of armed attack, as distinct from its qualitative considera-
tion, is substantial enough to warrant the victim State to act in self-
defence. If the act of armed attack is of little significance or on a
small scale, or if it may be settled or contained by some other means
than a resort to force in self-defence, there would be no justifiable
ground for taking measures in self-defence. Infiltration of a small
group of armed or unarmed bands or an attack on a fishing boat on
the high sea may be mentioned as examples.
The quantitative consideration of an act of armed attack has also
some bearing on the amount of seriousness of the measures to be un-
dertaken in self-defence, since the latter must not be out of all propor-
tion with the former and must be kept within the necessity of self-
defence.21
Just as the concept of aggression, the concept of an armed attack
within the meaning of Article 51 is extremely difficult to define. No
definition of it, whether by the enumerative, general or mixed meth-
ods, can claim to be complete or exhaustive or can be applied auto-
matically to all actual cases. The question whether an act constitutes
an armed attack shall be determined by a competent organ of the
United Nations in each case in the light of the whole circumstances
of the case. In the past, however, the Security Council and the Gen-
eral Assembly have encountered little difficulty in determining, ex-
plicitly or impliedly, that a particular resort to force has constituted
an armed attack. 22
20 Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defence in Art. 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 872, 878 (1947).
21 Accord, Spiropoulos, G.A.O.R., (VI) (1951), Sixth Comm., 279th Mtg., Para. 13.
22 E.g., the Korean Question, S.C. Resolutions of 25 and 27 June, 1950; the Suez Canal
Question, in which the majority members of the Assembly recognized that the invasion
on the part of Israel, the United Kingdom and France constituted an armed attack;
the Hungarian Question in which the draft resolution submitted by the United States
(A/3286) and the G.A. Resolution 1004 (ES-II) condemned the Soviet armed in-
tervention in Hungary and characterized it as an armed attack.
SELF-DEFENCE-UNDER THE U.N. CHARTER
Rling proposed in the 1956 Special Committee on the Question of
Defining Aggression that the concept of aggression may be ascer-
tained through a definition of the concept of armed attack within the
meaning of Article 51. He thereupon formulated the following draft
definition:
Armed attack... in Article 51 is the use of armed force which leaves the State
against which it is directed no other than military means to preserve its terri-
torial integrity or political independence .... 23
Apart from the question whether the concept of aggression can be
ascertained by the notion of armed attack, the above formula con-
tains a number of loopholes. It seems to limit the concept of armed
attack to a direct use of force and to cases where the act of force has
actually taken place; it does not include use of force in an indirect way
or an imminent threat of attack. Furthermore, by limiting the objects
of an armed attack to the rights of territorial integrity and political
independence, it excludes a State from taking measures of self-defence
when its other rights of vital importance have become the objects of
an armed attack.
As expected, this formula has also been severely criticized by many
other delegates, including those of the United States, the Soviet Union
and China, on various grounds-some of them were, however, ob-
viously of a political nature.2 4
The concept of armed attack is not of a fixed and unchangeable
nature; rather, it inevitably changes as the methods of warfare,
various means of aggression or intervention and the technology in
modern weapons develop and change. Certainly the emergence of
nuclear weapons, long-range missiles or rockets and the recent ex-
ploration and advancement in outer space have a profound bearing on
the concept of armed attack.2 5 It was mainly because of this flexible
23 Report of the 1956 Special Comm., op. cit. supra n. 13, SR. 13, at 17.
24 For the criticism of the representative of China, see id., SR. 14, at 3. The represent-
ative of the Soviet Union remarked that RMling's definition did not specify what types
of acts are envisaged as acts of a military nature, that it did not mention the role of the
Security Council, and that it was limited only to the territorial integrity and political
independence, although Art. 51 did not so require. Id., SR. 10, at 6.
25 In its first report to the Security Council, the Atomic Energy Commission pointed
Out:
"In consideration of the problem of violation of the terms of the treaty or convention,
it should also be borne in mind that a violation might be of so grave a character as
to give rise to the inherent right of self-defence recognized in Art. 51 of the Charter...."
U.N. Doc. AEC/18/Rev. 1, at 24; A.E.C. Special Supp. (1946), Part III, at 19; also in
16 DFP'T STATE BULL. 112 (1948), 112.
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nature of the concept of armed attack (and of aggression) that an
attempt at the San Francisco Conference to insert a definition of
aggression in the Charter failed, and all subsequent efforts which have
been made since 1951 to define aggression within the framework of
the United Nations have been unsuccessful.26 The view outlined here
has been shared, explicitly or tacitly, by the majority of the Member
States-particularly those of the Western and non-aligned blocs-as
well as by the Secretary-General. In his instructions to the United
Nations forces in the Congo operation, the Secretary-General pointed
out that the U.N. forces should not fire unless for the necessity of
self-defence; he, however, added that any attempt to use force for
compelling the U.N. forces to withdraw should be regarded as an
act of armed attack and could be resisted by force in self-defence.2 1
In determining whether an act constitutes an armed attack, the
methods or weapons used, its danger and the defensibility against it,
among others, should be taken into consideration. As a general rule,
however, an armed attack must involve an element of threat or use of
force, whether direct or indirect and whether actual or imminent,
which is of such a grace and urgent nature as to endanger the essen-
tial rights of the State thus attacked.
PART 2. THE LEGAL INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER
A. IS THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 5 1 LIMITED TO CASES
OF AN ARMED ATTACK ONLY?
Article 51 of the Charter, on the one hand, provides that "nothing
in the present Charter impairs the inherent right of individual or col-
lective self-defence" and continues with the proviso, on the other
hand, "if an armed attack occurs" against a Member State. If the right
of self-defence is an inherent or natural right of States, then it cannot
be impaired, divided or deprived of by a treaty, and, consequently,
that right as it was recognized under customary international law
should have remained unchanged in the Charter.28
However, the term inherent in that provision does not have any
particular legal significance but is merely an expression of the nat-
ural-law thought of the draftsmen of the Charter with regard to the
20 See Report by M. Paul-Boncour, Rapporteur of Committee 111/3 June 10, 1945.
Doc. 881, 111/3/46; 12 U.N.C.I.O., at 505.
27 U.S. Doc. S/4389/Add. 1-6 at 15; see also S/4451, Para. 6.
28 See GOODRICH & HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 301 (1952).
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right of self-defence. 29 The majority members of the International
Law Commission were of the same view; when discussing the Pana-
manian draft of Declaration of Rights and Duties of States, they de-
leted the word inberent in the article concerning the right of self-
defence. 0
The proviso "if an armed attack occurs," however, seems to mean
that under Article 51 the right of self-defence has been limited to
cases where an armed attack has been committed; there can be no self-
defence without an armed attack. Should the draftsmen of the Char-
ter really have not had such an intention, they would not have in-
serted this unambiguous proviso in the text of Article 51. This inter-
pretation is fully in accord with the principle of interpretation of
treaties that the text of a treaty should not be construed as meaning-
less. It is also supported by the legal canon, expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. Furthermore, there is nothing in the travaux prdparatories of
the Charter to indicate that the draftsmen of the Charter did intend
that the proviso should have no restrictive effect on the right of self-
defence.31
It has been argued by some that Article 51 was adopted in the
San Francisco Conference because of the necessity of giving members
of regional arrangements an assurance to undertake measures in self-
defence and recognizing the right of collective self-defence, and not
with a view to restricting the right of self-defence as it was recognized
under customary international law. Consequently, they contend,
Article 51 should not be construed as having any restrictive effect on
the right of self-defence to which the Member States were entitled
under customary international law prior to the Charter. 2 However,
as the World Court has repeatedly held, the travaux prdparatories of
29 Accord, Kelsen, Limitation on the Functions of the United Nations, 55 Yale L. J.
997, 1008 (1946) ; Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defence in Art. 51 of the Charter
of the United Nations, op. cit. supra n. 20 at 876; Wehberg, L'Interdiction du recours
d la force. Le principe et les problimes qui se posent, op. cit. supra n. 11 at 81; contra
THOMAS & THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION: THE LAW AND ITS IMPORT IN THE AMERICAS 123
(1956).
30 See Y. B. INT'L L. COMM'N (1949); 14th Mtg., Para. 61, the vote was 9 to 2.
31 In the course of the San Francisco Conference, France proposed that in case the
Security Council fails to reach a decision, the Member States should be entitled to
"the right to act as they may consider necessary" for defending their rights and justice.
3 U.N.C.I.O., at 379, Doc. 2, G/7(o), Part II, at 2-3. This proposal was rejected by the
Conference.
32 See, for example, Bowett, The Use of Force in the Protection of Nationals, 43
TRANSAcT. GROT. Soc'y 111, 115-16 (1957); Waldock, The Regulation of the Use
of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81 RECUEtM DES Cours II 455, 496-97
(1952).
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a treaty shall not be used to change the meaning of the text of the
treaty when the text is itself reasonably clear.33 Furthermore, parties
to a treaty should be presumed to have intended to put a certain effect
in the text of a treaty and not to make it meaningless; an interpretation
which would make the text of a treaty meaningless or ridiculous is
not admissible.
In the course of the debate on the question of defining aggression
in various sessions of the General Assembly Sixth Committee and the
1953 and 1956 Special Committees, the views of various Member
States on the question under discussion were aired and may be sum-
marized as follows:
All members of the Soviet bloc strongly insisted that under Article
51 the right of self-defence is permissible only in cases of armed at-
tack; against any other types of illegal use of force, the victim State
could only resort to other means of peaceful settlement, but is not
allowed to resort to force in self-defence.
Almost all of the non-aligned and most of the Western bloc mem-
bers were substantially of the same view, although some of the West-
ern bloc members, in particular the United States, the Netherlands,
Greece and France, were inclined to have a rather flexible and broad
interpretation of the term armed attack.
Only the United Kingdom and China maintained that Article 51
did not limit the right of self-defence to cases of armed attack and
that that right, as it was recognized and understood under customary
international law prior to the Charter, remained unaffected.
The International Law Commission also discussed this question in
the course of its debate on the Draft Declaration on Rights and
Duties of States in 1949. Nine members of the Commission, Spirop-
oulos, Alfaro, Cardova, Hudson, Amado, Brierly, Standstr6m, Kret-
sky and Scelle were of the view that the right of self-defence under
Article 51 has been limited to cases of armed attack. Only one
member, Hsu of China, was of the view that the phrase "if an armed
attack occurs, in Article 51 was merely an example of instances jus-
tifying resort to force in self-defence.3 4
The Commission finally, by 8 votes to 1, adopted an amendment
83Accord, Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defence in Art. 51 of the Charter
of the United Nations, op. cit. supra n. 29 at 873. See P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 11, at 39;
HUDSON, WORLD COURT REPORTS (1922-1926), Washington; CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT
FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 466 (1934); I.C.J. REPORTS 63 (1947-1948).
34 Y. B. INT'L L. COMM'N (1949), 14th Mtg., Para. 92.
SELF-DEFENCE-UNDER THE U.N. CHARTER
proposed by Hudson that the phrase "against armed attack" be in-
serted in the original Panamanian draft Article 11, which provided
that every State should have the right of self-defence, without refer-
ring to its causes. 5
Similarly, the overwhelming majority of writers are of the view
that the right of self-defence under Article 51 has been limited to
cases of armed attack only. The Charter, in their view, has imposed
that restriction on the right of self-defence under customary inter-
national law-which was presumably wider-and, consequently: no
right of self-defence may be invoked against an illegal use of force
which does not constitute an armed attack within the meaning of
Article 51.
While considerably in agreement on this basic point, they are, how-
ever, not fully in accord with regard to the interpretation of the
nature and scope of the concept of armed attack within the meaning
of Article 51.
The majority of this group of writers have maintained a literal and
considerably strict interpretation of the term armed attack. The
principal proponents of this view are Kelsen, Pompe, Jessup, Weh-
berg, Hudson and Ninci6.3 0 The main theses of this division, in addi-
tion to the points mentioned above, are that the exceptional character
of Article 51 and the underlying principles of the Charter require
that article to be interpreted strictly, exceptiones sunt strictissimae
interpretations; that the term attack should be interpreted as an
attack or invasion by armed force which is the gravest of all acts of
aggression; and that, consequently, nothing less than an armed attack
should be considered to constitute an act against which the right of
self-defence may be invoked-acts, as for example, subversion, ideo-
logical or economic aggression and other forms of indirect aggression.
The other division of this group of writers, however, have upheld
a considerably flexible and broad interpretation of the term armed
35 Id., 20th Mtg., Para, 71.
36 See Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 792, 797; also
KELSEN, RECENT TRENDS IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 914 (1951); POMPE, AGRES-
SIVE WAR, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME 90-100 (1953); JESsup, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS
166 (1952); WEHIERG, L'Interdiction du recours d la force. La Principe et les problmes
qui se posent, op. cit. supra n. 29 at 81; Hudson, Y. B. INT'L L. COMM'N (1949), 14th Mtg.,
Para. 81; Nin6i6, Report on Some Aspects of Self-Defence in the Charter of the United
Nations 69 (Int'l L. Assoc. N.Y. Univ. Conference 1958). See also, BECKETT, THE NORTH
ATLANTIC TREATY 13 (1950); Tucker, The Legal Interpretation of War Under Present
International Law, 4 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 11, 29 (1951); Dinh, La L~gitime Dfense
d'aprs la Charte des Nations Unies, 52 R.G.D.I.P. 240, 244 (1948).
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attack. Their main arguments are that under the present conditions of
international community too literal and strict an interpretation of the
concept of armed attack is unrealistic and dangerous; and that the
methods of violating the essential rights, in particular the right of
political independence, of other States have undergone a substantial
change in recent years, and States are susceptible to violation through
various means other than an open armed attack or invasion. The
principal proponents of this view are Roling, Wright, Scelle and, to
some extent, Lauterpacht and Kunz.87
It should be noted that the opinion of the former division was made
and prevailed within the first few years of the United Nations; it,
however, has lost its support among writers and the public in general
during the recent years. Moreover, it has not been supported by, or
in accord with, the jurisprudence of the cases dealt with by the organs
of the United Nations and the position adopted by the great majority
of the Member States. On the contrary, the opinion of the latter
division, among them a number of prominent international lawyers,
has gained an increasing support among writers and by the jurispru-
dence of the United Nations organs. The reality of the life in the
international community has fully proved that the latter view is more
practical and reasonable, and is acceptable to the great majority of
the Member States.
A few writers, however, maintained an opposite view: that the
right of self-defence of the Member States is not limited to cases of
armed attack. Their main bases of argument are that Member States'
rights under customary international law remain unchanged under
the legal order of the Charter unless they have specifically been
prohibited by the Charter or transferred to the United Nations, and
that Article 51 was formulated in the San Francisco Conference, not
for restricting the right of self-defence, but for clarifying the position
of regional arrangements and ensuring the right of collective self-
defence. The principal proponents of this view are Bowett, Waldock
and Goodhart. 8
.37 See R6ing, The Question of Defining Aggression, op. cit. supra n. 7 at 316; Scelne,
Y. B. INT'L L. COMM'N (1949), 20th Mtg., Para. 69; Wright, United States Intervention
in the Lebanon, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 112, 117 (1959); 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW
156 (7th ed. 1952); Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defence in Art. 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations, op. cit. supra n. 20 at 877-78.
38 Bowett, The Use of Force in the Protection of Nationals, op. cit. supra n. 32 at
115-16; Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in Inter-
national Law, op. cit. supra n. 32 at 496-97; Goodhart, The North Atlantic Treaty
of 1949, 79 RECLIEIL DES COURS (II) 192, 202-03 (1951).
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Still other writers held a compromising and somewhat confusing
view. They conceded, in principle, that the right of self-defence un-
der the Charter has been restricted to cases of armed attack only;
they, nevertheless, maintained that the Member States' right of self-
defence under customary international law has not been withdrawn
by the Charter. The Member States still retain that right and may
invoke it once the assumptions on which the Charter stands fail to
operate or collapse-a situation as, for example, when the Security
Council fails to function normally. 9
This view, in effect, makes the right of self-defence under the
Charter a conditional one. It has been limited to cases of armed attack
only when the entire machinery of the United Nations, in particular
the Security Council, functions normally and effectively, and also
the great Powers maintain smooth cooperation among themselves.
Should these assumptions collapse, in their view, the Member States
would have automatically been entitled-that is, restored-to their
inherent right of self-defence under customary international law.
To advance this reasoning to the interpretation of the Charter, con-
sequently, would have resulted in a complete disintegration of the
Charter as early as 1946, when the cold war between the Soviet and
Western power blocs started and the veto was first cast by a perma-
nent member of the Council.
The practice of the Security Council and the General Assembly
with regard to the question under discussion, however, has been fully
in accord with the first view mentioned above.
In the case of Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956, Israel contended
that her invasion in the territory of Egypt was a security measure
based on the right of self-defence against the previous invasion com-
mitted by the fedayeen units from Egypt against Israel, and the
aggressive military alliance between Egypt, Syria and Jordan signed
shortly before. Regardless of whether these circumstances would have
justified a State to resort to force in preventive self-defence under
customary international law, the Security Council and the General
Assembly, by refusing to accept either that these acts on the part of
Egypt constituted an armed attack or that Israel's invasion could be
39 See Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental Principles of International Law, 87 RE-
CUEIL DES COURS (I) 195, 336-38 (1955); GOODRICH & HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, op. cit. supra n. 28 at 300-01; STONE, AGRESSION AND WORMD ORDER, 42-44
(1955). Goodrich and Hambro, however, further point out that the discovery of nuclear
weapons has made the right of self-defence of little value if it is limited to cases of
armed attack only. CHrtR OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Op. cit. supra n. 28 at 300-01.
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justified by these contentions, impliedly upheld the view that a Mem-
ber State is entitled to resort to force in self-defence only in cases of
armed attack.
Prior to the Anglo-French invasion in the Suez Canal area in 1956,
the British Government contended, inter alia, that Egypt's national-
ization of the Suez Canal constituted an act of aggression in violation
of international law, the Anglo-Egyptian treaties of 1888 and 1954
and the spirit of the Charter. Explaining the British position to the
House of Commons, the Foreign Secretary pointed out:
Nor would it be claimed that... Her Majesty's Government should take no
action to protect the lives of British subjects abroad unless and until they are
expressly authorized by the United Nations to do so. Art. 51 of the Charter
recognizes the right of self-defence and it would be a travesty of the Charter
to say that no intervention can take place until our nationals are actually being
attacked and perhaps killed.4 0
Similarly, the Lord Chanceller made the following statements con-
cerning the Government's position with regard to the right of self-
defence under the legal order of the Charter:
Again it is essential to remember that the right of individual self-defence was
regarded as automatically excepted from both the Covenant . . . and the Pact
of Paris without any mention of it, and clearly the same would have been true
in the Charter ... had there been no Art. 51 .... Art. 51 was not inserted in the
Charter for the purpose of destroying the individual right of self-defence, but
for the purpose of clarifying the position in regard to collective undertakings
for mutual self-defence, particularly the Pan-American Treaty, . . . known as
the Act of Chapultepec. These undertakings were concerned with defence
against external aggression and it was natural for Art. 51 to be related to defence
against attack.
Art. 51 must be read in the light that it is part of Chapter VII of the Charter
and concerned with defence against grave breaches of the peace. It would be
an entire misreading of the whole intention of Art. 51 to interpret it as forbidding
forcible self-defence in resistance to an illegal use of force not constituting an
armed attack. 41
To these contentions many members of the Opposition party in
both Houses strongly objected on the grounds that under the Charter
only in cases of armed attack can a Member State resort to force in
self-defence, and that even though the nationalization of the Canal
by the Egyptian authorities was illegal, that act could hardly be con-
sidered as constituting an armed attack.4 2
40 558 H. C. D u. Oct. 30, 1956, Cols. 1377-78; also 6 INT'L & CoMP. L. Q. 326-27 (1957).
41 199 H. C. DEB. Nov. 1, 1956, Cols. 1353-56, 1359; also 6 INT'L & CoMp. L. Q. 329-30
(1957).
42 199 H. C. DEB. Nov. 10, 1956, Cols. 637-1319.
SELF-DEFENCE-UNDER THE U.N. CHARTER
In their arguments before the Council and the Assembly, the
United Kingdom and France did not claim that Egypt had committed
any act of armed attack against them; instead, they advanced a theory
that their invasion was permissible under customary international law
as a self-defence or a lawful intervention, and that such act was not
prohibited by the Charter.
This Anglo-French argument was definitely rejected by the over-
whelming majority of the members of the Council and the Assembly
on the grounds that under the legal order of the Charter a Member
State is only allowed to resort to force in self-defence in cases of
armed attack, and that Egypt did not in the present case commit
or threaten to commit such an attack against the United Kingdom
or France.43
In the Palestine Question, on the other hand, Egypt claimed that
it was still at war with Israel and imposed in 1951 a restriction on
the passage of ships belonging to or destined for Israel through the
Suez Canal. Before the Council, Egypt argued that she deemed her-
self to be entitled to belligerent rights, including the right to impose
the above restriction; that Article 51 of the Charter did not impair
the Member States' right of self-defence as it existed under customary
international law; and that under the Constantinople Convention and
the Armistice Agreement she was entitled to take necessary measures
of self-defence for the safety of the Canal.44
Only two members of the Council, China and Iraq, supported these
Egyptian contentions. The majority members, however, were unable
to accept these arguments and held that since there was at that time
no armed attack or even an imminent threat of attack on the part of
Israel against the Canal, Egypt was not entitled to the right of self-
defence under Article 51.45
In its resolution adopted on September 1, 1951, the Council firmly
rejected the above Egyptian thesis of the right of self-defence, and
held that the Armistice Agreement was of a permanent character and
that neither party to it could claim any belligerent rights or exercise
the right of visit, search or seizure for any legitimate purpose of self-
43 Accord, Wright, Intervention, 1956, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 257, 273 (1957).
44 See YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONs, DEP'T PUB. INF. 293-99 (1951).
4 5 Accord, BowETr, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 191 (1954). By holding
that Egypt was in the present case not entitled to impose the restriction in question,
the Council impliedly denied the Egyptian contention that it was entitled to declare
was on Israel or exercise the belligerent rights.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
defence. It further found that such practice (i.e., the Egyptian re-
striction) could not, in the prevailing circumstances, be justified on
the ground of self-defence. The vote was 8 to 0, with3 abstentions. 46
In the Lebanon and Jordan Question in 1958, the question of the
nature and scope of the concept of armed attack was bitterly debated
before the Council and the Assembly. Accusing the sending of armed
forces by the United States and the United Kingdom to Lebanon and
Jordan, respectively, the Soviet Union, the United Arab Republic and
Sweden, among some other States, contended that under Article 51
only an armed attack-and a direct, serious and actual one-could
justify the victim State to resort to force in self-defence, whether
individual or collective. There was in the present case, they con-
tended, no armed attack on the part of any third State against Lebanon
and Jordan. 7
Against these contentions, all members of the Western bloc and
the majority of the members of the non-aligned bloc, in particular
the United States, the United Kingdom, China, France, as well as
Lebanon and Jordan, maintained that while Article 51 referred to
armed attack as a sine qua non for a lawful exercise of the right of
self-defence under the Charter, it did not specify or require that the
attack must be strictly a direct and open one; nor was such a strict
and narrow interpretation of the concept of armed attack acceptable,
they further contended, in view of the recent practice of indirect and
subtle means of aggression. 48 The position taken by the Western bloc
members in the present case was considerably a broad interpretation
of the concept of armed attack, a view generally accepted by the
great majority of the Member States as well as writers. Significantly,
they did not contend that the Member States are still entitled to the
right of self-defence under customary international law.
The practice of States, outside the United Nations, with regard to
the question under discussion has been that the Member States (as
well as non-Member States when they participate in a collective se-
curity pact with Member States) are entitled to resort to force in
self-defence only in cases of armed attack, even though their inter-
46 S.C.O.R., 6th Yr., 558th Mtg., Sept. 1. 1951, Para. 5; U.N. Doc. S/2322.
47 For the statement of the representative of the Soviet Union, see S.C.O.R., 13th Yr.,
827th Mtg., Para. 116; for that of the representative of Sweden, see id., 830th Mtg.,
Paras. 47-48.
48 See, for example, the statement of the representative of Lebanon before the Se-
curity Council, S.C.O.R., 13th Yr., 833rd Mtg., Para. 10.
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pretations as to the meaning and scope of the term armed attack have
not necessarily been the same.4"
The point that an act of aggression, even though involving the
use of force, which does not constitute an armed attack within the
meaning of Article 51 could not justify the victim State to exercise
the right of self-defence was clearly stipulated in the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947. Article 3 of that treaty pro-
vides that the parties to it are entitled to exercise the right of individ-
ual or collective self-defence in cases of armed attack, while Article
6 provides that in case of "an aggression which is not an armed
attack" the State which is the object of such aggression may only ask
the Organ of Consultation to consider the situation.
Of all the treaties, declarations and understandings concerning mu-
tual security arrangements under the framework of the Charter, how-
ever, nothing can be found that explicitly or tacitly stipulates to the
effect that the parties to it are entitled to exercise the right of individ-
ual or collective self-defence in case of acts of aggression not consti-
tuting an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51.
The right of self-defence was subjected to very stringent require-
ments under customary international law. It was allowed only in case
of absolute necessity, and the measures thus undertaken were not to
exceed what was most reasonable and essential for that purpose. Nor-
mally, no self-defence would be allowed unless the offence involved
the element of use of force and was directed against the essential
rights of the victim State. Against an offence which did not involve
the element of use of force or which was not urgent or serious, the
offended State may only resort to other means of remedy or settle-
ment. It would, therefore, be a mistake to maintain that under cus-
tomary international law a State was entitled to resort to force in
self-defence against any offence, without regard to the element of
use of force or the urgent nature or seriousness of the offence.
The juridical concept of self-defence was, however, of little prac-
tical significance under the international legal order prior to the
Covenant. The question whether a war or use of force was resorted
49 See various treaties of collective security concluded by the United States and other
Western Powers, in particular, North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 (Art. 3), Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 (Art. 3), and South Eastern Asia Treaty of 1954
(Art. 4, Para. 1). The Soviet bloc members have also frequently used the term armed
attack in their treaties providing for their collective security. See, for example, Warsaw
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of 1955 (Art. 4).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
to in legitimate self-defence or aggression was not so much a legal
question as a political one; self-defence was utilized to provide an
excuse or justification for a war or use of force which was resorted
to as an instrument of national policy without any legally justifiable
cause. It was natural, under these circumstances, that the right of
self-defence was often invoked to justify acts of force against various
forms of offences with different degrees of seriousness and urgency.
The situation is, however, substantially different under the legal
order of the Charter. The general and complete prohibition of the
threat or use of force, and the maintenance of international peace and
security by collective measures under the authority and through the
organs of the United Nations are two fundamental principles of the
Charter. The right of self-defence, under these circumstances, consti-
tutes an exception to the general principle of the prohibition of use
of force. The Member States may lawfully resort to force only under
the circumstances envisaged in Article 51. It is both natural and neces-
sary for the Charter to impose strict restrictions on that right-viz.,
to allow that right only under the most strictly limited and serious
circumstances. This is indeed a necessary conclusion from the inter-
pretation of the Charter with regard to the right of self-defence.
Moreover, the Member States have assumed under the Charter obli-
gations not to threaten or use armed force, and to settle their disputes
by peaceful means, including a settlement through the Security Coun-
cil or the General Assembly. The Member States have assumed these
obligations by accepting a multilateral treaty of greatest importance,
which has the character of a law-making treaty. Article 103 of the
Charter provides that the obligations under the Charter shall prevail
over any other obligations of the Member States which may conflict
with the former. Similarly, in case of conflict between the rights of
the Members with their obligations under the Charter, the latter shall
prevail over the former; in such a case the Member States have re-
nounced their rights, to the extent to which these rights are inconsist-
ent with their obligations under the Charter, when they accepted the
Charter.
For these reasons, the view that the right of self-defence which the
Member States had under customary international law was not af-
fected by the Charter is not acceptable. The above-said argument
based on the legislative history of Article 51 in the San Francisco
Conference does not support the view in question.
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Nor can we accept the view that under customary international
law the right of self-defence was so broad as to cover an illegal act
which did not involve the element of use of force or, even when it
involved such an element, was of little seriousness or urgency. Such
a description was not true under customary international law, and
much more so under the legal order of the Charter.
Nor can we share the view that the obligations of the Member
States under the Charter are of a provisional or conditional nature.
No basis for this theory can be found in the Charter or international
law. A State is not entitled to reduce or relieve itself from its obliga-
tions under a treaty to which it is a party, unless specifically so pro-
vided in the treaty itself or in accordance with the principles of
international law. This is especially so when the treaty is a law-making
one and has been generally accepted by virtually all States in the
international community.
On the other hand, neither is an interpretation acceptable which
construes the term armed attack in Article 51 in its narrowest possible
and extremely literal sense-viz., an open, direct and actual attack or
invasion committed by regular armed forces of a State against another
State. This interpretation would, in effect, have made the right of
self-defence under the Charter an empty gesture and Article 51 a
dead provision. It would also have prohibited the victim of an act of
aggression, which does not constitute a typical armed attack but is
dangerous enough to violate its essential rights, from taking any
measures of self-defence.
The conclusion is that the term armed attack within the meaning of
Article 51 of the Charter should be interpreted and determined in the
light of the actual conditions of things in the international society.
Among others, the methods of aggression or other illegal acts vio-
lating essential rights of another State, the qualitative and quantitative
elements of the act in question, the urgent nature of the situation,
and the availability of the effectiveness of the Council or the Assembly
should be taken into consideration."
From the above observations, it becomes clear that virtually all
Member States have accepted the view that the right of self-defence
under the Charter has been limited to cases of armed attack. Those
few States which contended, when they had resorted to force in
50 Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental Principles of International Law, op. cit. supra
n. 39 at 339.
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violation of Article 51, that the right was not so restricted did so
entirely out of political considerations in order to justify their own
acts in question. Even these States did not really support that view
consistently; they have frequently changed that position whenever
they found themselves to be on a different side of the issue. 1
While the overwhelming majority of writers and the Member
States are equally of the view described above, they are less in accord
with regard to the question whether Article 51 permits self-defence
in cases of an imminent threat of attack and whether the right may
be exercised against acts of indirect aggression.
B. IS THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE IN ARTICLE 51 LIMITED TO CASES
WHERE AN ARMED ATTACK HAS ACTUALLY TAKEN PLACE?
Article 51 further provides that the inherent right of self-defence
may be exercised "if an armed attack occurs. . . ." This wording makes
it possible to interpret that the provision intended further to limit the
right of self-defence only to cases where an armed attack has actually
taken place; no right of self-defence can be invoked against a mere
threat or preparation of an armed attack.
This interpretation has been strongly adhered to by all members
of the Soviet bloc.52 Few States outside that bloc supported that view;
they include Iran, Mexico and few other non-aligned members.3
The reasons in support of this view are that the provision of Article
51 clearly provides that the right of self-defence may be exercised
"if an armed attack occurs ... ," which means after an armed attack
has already taken place and is still in progress; that a threat of attack
is after all different from an armed attack itself, and, under the Char-
ter the threatened State has the right and assumes an obligation to
bring the matter to the Security Council or to settle it by peaceful
means; and that to permit the use of force in self-defence against a
threat of attack, as distinct from an actual attack, would be tanta-
51 See, for example, the position taken by the United Kingdom, France, Egypt
(U.A.R.) and Israel in various cases in which they were involved.
52See G.A.O.R., (IX), Sixth Comm., 406th Mtg., Para. 39 (Poland); id., 408th Mtg.,
Para. 43 (Ukraine); id. 411th Mtg., Para. 15 (Byelorrusian S.S.R.); id., 413th Mtg.,
Para. 11 (Czechoslovakia); and REPORT OF THE 1953 SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE QUES-
TION OF DEFINING AGGRESSION, U.N. Doc., A/AC.66/SR. 9, 15-16 (Soviet Union). The
Report may be found in G.A.O.R., (IX), Supp. No 11, (A/2638).
53 See G.A.O.R., (IX) (1954), Sixth Comm., 408th Mtg., Para. 32 (Mexico).
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mount to permitting potential aggressors to engage in a preventive
war or even outright aggression under the cloak of self-defence.5 4
This interpretation of the right of self-defence under the Charter,
however, has strongly been opposed by the majority Members of the
United Nations, in particular the United States, the United Kingdom,
France, China, Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, Norway and Den-
mark.55 Their main points of arguments are as follows: While Ar-
ticle 51 has restricted the right of self-defence to cases of armed
attack, it has not required that the attack must have actually taken
place. The right of self-defence against an imminent threat of attack
or invasion was traditionally recognized under customary interna-
tional law, as has recently been upheld by the Nuremberg and Tokyo
International Military Tribunals, as well as under all municipal legal
systems. The most important function of the right of self-defence,
in their view, is to prevent a real and imminent threat of attack from
taking place, and not merely to resist or suppress an attack which
has already taken place; consequently, to prohibit self-defence against
such a threat of attack would have resulted in depriving that right
of its essential function and rendering it virtually meaningless. They
further point out that the discovery of nuclear and other modern
weapons of mass destruction and the advancement in modern tech-
nology have made it imperative for the threatened State to take neces-
sary measures in self-defence once the threat of an armed attack is
real and imminent, without the necessity of waiting for the first blow
from such an attack.56
In the International Law Commission, when it discussed this ques-
tion in 1949, the opinion was rather divergent. The majority mem-
54 See the statement of the Soviet member in the International Law Commission
(Koretsky), Y. B. Irr'L L. COMM'N, (1949), 14th Mtg., Para. 103. Beside the provision
that any State which first commits an act of aggression would automatically be regarded
as an aggressor, each version of the draft definition of aggression submitted by the
Soviet Union (1933, 1951 and 1953) provides that in case of a threat of aggression,
such as mobilization or concentration of armed forces in the frontier, the threatened
State may only have recourse to peaceful means or take similar measures of a military
nature without crossing the frontier.
55 Speaking before the 1953 SPECIAL COMMIrEE ON THE QUESTION OF DEFINING
AGGRESSION, the representative of the United States pointed out:
[I]t would be impossible to adhere strictly to the chronological criterion ... if the
United States had learned that the Japanese were preparing to bomb its fleet at Pearl
Harbor it could, without thereby committing an act of aggression, have struck first
to destroy the Japanese aircrafts before they had carried out their mission ...
REPORT OF THE 1953 SPECIAL COMM., op. cit. supra SR. 9, at 13.
56 See Part 1, p. 16 supra.
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bers were, however, in favor of the latter view. An amendment pro-
posed by Hudson that the words "if an armed attack occurs ..."
be inserted in the Panamanian draft concerning the right of self-
defence was rejected by the Commission because, they feared, the
word occurs might be interpreted as requiring an armed attack to have
actually taken place before the right may be invoked. After that word
was deleted, the amendment was finally adopted by a vote of 8 to 1. "
Similarly, in its report in 1951, the Commission expressed its view
that threat of force should be included in the concept of aggression."
The International Court of Justice, though indirectly, upheld the
same view in the Corfu Channel Case.5
Those States and writers who are in favor of the second view,
however, do not claim that any threat of attack should justify the
threatened State to act in self-defence; it is only a real and imminent
or impending threat of attack or invasion of a grave nature and
urgency that is contemplated. But what is an imminent threat of
attack? Rling of the Netherlands explained that only "an imminent
threat of attack in which the threatened State had no time for any
other action than immediate self-defence" could justify self-defence
under Article 51.60 He further elaborated that an imminent threat of
attack should be specifically and clearly directed against another
State and that it must be on the point of being carried out.61
A mere fear of apprehension of a possible attack without clear and
present danger or without any concrete ground to substantiate it, or
a remote and uncertain possibility of an attack, would not be suffi-
cient to constitute a real and imminent threat of attack justifying the
threatened State in taking measures of self-defence in accordance
57 See Y. B. INT'L L. COMM'N (1949), 14th Mtg., Para. 107, and 20th Mtg., Para. 71.
Scelle stated in this connection that while he was in favor of adding the words "against
armed attack," he opposed the proposal made by Hudson. "It was advisable to allow
States some latitude when it came to deciding at which moment self-defence should
come into operation," he said. Id., 20th Mtg., Para. 69.
S8 REPORT OF THE INT'L L. COMM'N COVERING THE WORK OF ITS THIRD SESSION, 16 May-
27 July 1951, U.N. Doc. A/1858, Para. 48.
59 I.C.J. REPORTS, 30-31 (1949). See Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force
by Individual State in International Law, op. cit. supra n. 32 at 500-01, where the author
deduced the position of the Court concerning the right of self-defence as regarding it
is "enough if there is a strong probability of armed attack-an imminent threat of armed
attack" and that it "did not take a narrow view of the inherent right of self-defence
reserved by Art. 51." Accord, BowETr, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, op. cit.
supra n. 45 at 187-93.
60 G.A.O.R., (IX) (1954), Sixth Comm., 410 Mtg., Para. 43.
61 REPORT OF THE 1956 SPECIAL COMM., Op. cit. supra n. 13, SR. 13, at 17.
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with Article 51. While the actual situation of an imminent threat of
attack or invasion takes a variety of forms and degrees and develops
gradually, the essential factors of such a threat of attack, for the pur-
pose of invoking the right of self-defence, are as follows: Substantial
or essential preparatory steps of such an attack must have been com-
pleted, and the act of attack or invasion is being commenced or is
going to be commenced at any moment-a state of readiness. The
preparatory measures thus made and the act of attack being com-
menced must be of a grave nature, and the situation must be so
urgent that the threatened State would have no alternative means nor
any room to wait for any other remedy but to resort to measures of
self-defence in order to protect itself from the attack.6 2 When these
conditions are met, the measures taken would constitute a lawful
exercise of the right of self-defence, even though no soldier has yet
crossed the frontier and no aircraft or long-range missile has yet taken
off or been fired; the chronological order of events is, therefore, im-
material in determining the legality of the acts in question.
63
Although the Soviet bloc members maintain that a threat of attack
cannot justify self-defence, they do not mean that the threatened
State must wait idle for the first blow before it can be allowed to
retaliate in self-defence. The Soviet delegate (Morozov) in the 1953
Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, explain-
ing what his country meant by the term threat of attack, said that as
62 See Wright, United States Intervention in the Lebanon, op. cit. supra n. 37 at 117,
in which the author says: "[Tihe term 'armed attack' in Art. 51 should be broadened
to include an imminent threat of armed attack .... It is clear, however, that threats
justifying ... self-defence cannot be extended beyond situations presenting an immedi-
ate danger of 'armed attack.' They cannot be extended, for example, to attacks upon
a State by propaganda, infiltration, subversion or other acts sometimes called "indirect
aggression'"...
63 The so-called principle of priority (i.e., whoever hits first shall be regarded as
an aggressor and the victim of the first blow as a State resorting to force in legitimate
self-defence) has been upheld by those States which favor the abovesaid restrictive view
(all members of the Soviet bloc and a few members of the non-aligned bloc); the
Western Powers and most members of the non-aligned bloc, which maintain that the
right of self-defence may be allowed against an imminent threat of attack, have
strongly opposed that view. The main thesis of the first view is that to refute that
principle would amount to permitting potential aggressors to conduct a preventive war
or aggression by arguing that they were acting in self-defence against an imminent threat
of attack. See the statement of the representative of the Soviet Union, REPORT OF THE
1953 SPECIAL COMM., op. cit. supra n. 55, SR. 9, at 15. Opposing this Soviet view, R6ting
pointed out that the major factors in this connection are "the nature and magnitude
of the act of aggression," and not the chronological order of the acts of force taken by
one or the other side. REPORT OF THE 1956 SPECIL COMM., op. cit. supra n. 13, SR. 8,
at 8-9.
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soon as the intention to attack has been translated into action, that is,
when acts constituting an armed attack had been committed, the
threatened State may take measures of self-defence. 4 Thus, the Soviet
delegate seemed to distinguish an uncertain and remote threat or
preparation of attack from a real and imminent threat of attack in
which some constituent act or acts of an attack has been initiated,
though the prospective victim State has not yet actually been at-
tacked. A mobilization or concentration of troops within a State's
own territory normally belongs to the former category, while a case
in which bombers intending to attack a neighboring State have taken
off from the base but have not crossed the border line belongs to the
latter category.
Thus analysed, it appears that the discrepancy between the above
two opposing views is a matter of difference in degree and not differ-
ence in substance.
Unlike the question discussed in "A" above, the difference of opin-
ion of Various writers on the question under discussion has been much
more acute. Generally speaking, those writers who maintain a strict
interpretation of the term armed attack equally insist on a strict inter-
pretation of the phrase if an armed attack occurs;65 those writers who
favor a flexible and broad interpretation of the term armed attack66
and, of course, those writers who hold that the right of self-defence
has not been affected by the Charter17 are of the view that Article 51
64 Report of the 1953 Special Comm., op. cit. supra n. 13, SR. 9, at 15.
65 The principal figures of this category are: Kelsen, Limitation on the Functions
of the United Nations, op. cit. supra n. 29 at 1010; Wehberg, L'Interdiction du recours
J la force. Le Principe et les probldmes qui se posent, op. cit. supra n. 11 at 82-83;
Hudson, Y. B. INT'L L. COMM'N (1949), 14th Mtg., Para. 81; Nin~i, Report on Some
Aspects of Self-Defence in the Charter of the United Nations, op. cit. supra n. 36
at 69; Jessup, Beckett, Pompe and McNair.
66 The principal figures of this category are: R61ing, The Question of Defining
Aggression, op. cit. supra n. 7 at 316; Brierly, Y. B. INr'L L. COMM's (1949), 14th Mtg.,
Para. 94; Wright, United States Intervention is the Lebanon, op. cit. supra n. 37 at 117;
and to a less extent, 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 190 (7th ed. 1952); Scelle,
Y. B. INT'L L. COMM's (1949), 20th Mtg., Para. 69; and McDougal.
67 The principal figures of this category are: BowETr, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW, op. cit. supra n. 45 at 191-92; also Nin6i, Report on Some Aspects of Self-Defence
in the Charter of the United Nations, op. cit. supra n. 36 at 49; Goodhart, The North
Atlantic Treaty, op. cit. supra n. 39 at 202-03; Waldock, The Regulation of the Use
of Force by Individual States in International. Law, op. cit. supra n. 32 at 497-99; Hsu,
Y. B. INT'L L. COMM'N (1949), 14th Mtg., Paras. 89, 94; STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD
ORDER, Op. cit. supra n. 39 at 94; GOODRICH & HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
op. cit. supra n. 39 at 300; and Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental Principles of
INTERNATIONAL LAW, Op. cit. supra n. 39 at 333.
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does not require an armed attack to have already occurred before the
right of self-defence may be lawfully invoked.
In addition to the practical reasons summarized above, the former
group of writers (the restrictive view) base their reasoning on a strict
and literal interpretation of the text of Article 51, and the principle
exceptiones sunt strictissimae interpretationis. They further point out
that the rules of customary international law with regard to the right
of self-defence are no longer relevant, since they are clearly incon-
sistent with Article 51 of the Charter and have, therefore, been re-
pealed by the Charter. The fact that the Security Council and the
General Assembly have on many occasions been unable to function
effectively in accordance with the Charter should not, in their view,
be used as a ground for impairing the general validity of Article 51
or to detract the right of self-defence under the Charter of its excep-
tional and restricted character.
68
The main legal arguments advanced by the latter group of writers
(the flexible view) are that the right of self-defence under customary
international law has not been affected by the Charter,69 and that law
must be interpreted in such a way as not to lead to an unreasonable
or ridiculous conclusion. To interpret that the Member States have
been prohibited from taking measures of self-defence against an im-
minent threat of armed attack is, in their view, both unreasonable and
unrealistic.
The question, it is submitted, should be considered from the view-
points of the interpretation of the term occur in the context of
Article 51 and the application of the right of self-defence in the
reality of international life. Just as the term armed attack, the term
occur should also be interpreted in such a way as not to render the
provision of Article 51 entirely unreasonable or ridiculous.
The term occur does not necessarily mean that an act must have
already taken place and reached its full-fledged stage; even at its very
initial stage, the act may still be considered to have occurred. Further-
more, from the viewpoint of international as well as criminal law,
whenever an armed attack has been fully prepared with a view to
specifically attacking a particular State and is ready to be launched at
any moment, the very attack may be regarded as having occurred,
68See Nini, Report on Some Aspects of Self-Defence in the Charter, op. cit. supra
of Czechoslovakia, see id., 418th Mtg., Para. 44.
69 SeeBowErr, SF-DFaENc IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, op. cit. supra n. 45 at 49.
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since the state of readiness constitutes a serious threat of attack
toward the threatened State; in such a case the armed attack has been
committed through an omission, as distinguished from an active
commission.
The right to act in self-defence against an imminent threat of
attack has been recognized as an integral part of the right of self-
defence under customary international law as well as the municipal
legal systems. In view of the inadequate nature of the machinery un-
der the legal order of the Charter to prevent or suppress an illegal
use of force, and the fact that the modern weapons of mass destruc-
tion and the development in technology have made it extremely
dangerous for the threatened State to wait for the first blow, the right
to resort to force in self-defence when the armed attack is imminent
is both imperative and reasonable. To deprive the Member States of
this right would be tantamount to a virtual denial of the very right
of self-defence and would, furthermore, be inconsistent with both
general international law and the Charter.
PART 3. ACTS OF INDIRECT AGGRESSION AND THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE
With regard to the question against what kinds of acts of indirect
aggression and under what circumstances may the victim State invoke
the right of self-defence, the general principle is that only against
those acts of indirect aggression which involve the element of threat
or use of force and are serious and urgent enough to endanger the
essential rights of the victim State, can that right be invoked. Against
those acts of indirect aggression which do not involve such an ele-
ment or, even when they involve such an element, the acts themselves
are not serious and urgent enough, the victim State will not be allowed
to take military measures in self-defence.
On this question, again, the position of various Member States has
been considerably in disagreement. The question furthermore pre-
sents some confusion and uncertainty because the nature and scope
of the concept of indirect aggression itself are to a large extent un-
certain and have been the subject of controversy among the Member
States as well as writers.
As to the right of self-defence against acts of supporting armed
bands in a State with a view to invade the territory of another State,
the prevailing view has been that against acts of active support of
such armed bands the victim State is entitled, if other requirements
are also satisfied, to take military measures in self-defence. This view
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has generally been upheld by most Western and non-aligned mem-
bers, most writers and the practice of the United Nations organs, and
not seriously contested by the Soviet bloc members. 70
As mentioned above, against a mere failure on the part of the
authorities of a State, in whose territory the armed bands organized
themselves and from which they started their invasion, to exercise
due diligence in taking necessary measures to prevent the bands from
invading another State or to suppress them, the invaded State may
not invoke the right of self-defence. On this point, there seems to be
a tacit but general acceptance among the Member States.
As to the right of self-defence against various forms of subversive
activities, the positions taken by the Soviet and Western blocs have
been seriously in conflict. While the Soviet Union added various acts
of indirect aggression, including subversive activities and fomenting
civil strife, in its draft definition of aggression submitted in 1953, its
position has remained that against such acts of indirect aggression no
right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter may be invoked;
the main ground is that such acts cannot be regarded as constituting
an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51. An examination
of the debates in various bodies of the United Nations on the question
of defining aggression in recent years reveals that the Soviet Union
and other members of the Soviet bloc are strongly of the view that
against any and all acts of indirect aggression (not including support
of armed bands), no right of self-defence may be invoked; this is so
without regard to whether or not the acts involve the element of
threat or even use of force.71
On this particular question, however, most members of the Western
bloc and the majority of the non-aligned members maintain virtually
an opposite position. In their opinion, acts of indirect aggression may
be divided into two categories, one involving the element of threat
or use of force and the other not. Against acts belonging to the latter
category, no military measure in self-defence may be allowed, since
such acts can hardly be regarded as acts of armed attack, even under
a broad interpretation of the term. Acts, as for example, so-called
economic or ideological aggression, hostile radio propaganda, and
TOThe Soviet Union for the first time in 1951 added the item of support of armed
bands organized in a State's own territory which invaded the territory of another State
among acts of aggression. See U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.208.
71 See the statements of the representative of the Soviet Union, G.A.O.R., (IX)
(1954), Sixth Comm, 403d Mtg., Paras. 7-20, and 414th Mtg., Para. 36; for the position
of Czechoslovakia, see id., 418th Mtg., Para. 44.
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fomenting civil strife in another State without substantial assistance
in war materials or personnel belong to this type of indirect aggres-
sion. Against those acts of indirect aggression which involve the
element of threat or, particularly, use of force, the victim State may
be allowed to take appropriate military measures in self-defence pro-
vided the acts in question are serious and the situation urgent enough
to warrant such measures.72
In view of the fact that the concept of indirect aggression itself
remains uncertain and no definition branding it as aggression has been
accepted by States, it seems to be of little practical value to elaborate
upon the question of the right of self-defence against such acts in
terms of indirect aggression. The question, however, should be con-
sidered from the point of view of the general principles governing
the right of self-defence under the Charter as discussed in the present
study.
CONCLUSION
In short, the right of self-defence under the Charter is not created
by, or to be determined solely in terms of, the Charter. It is a right
under general international law to which the Charter explicitly refers
to as not having been "impaired" by the latter. In its interpretation
and application to an actual case, however, that right should be inter-
preted and applied in such a way as not to lead to an unrealistic, un-
reasonable or ridiculous conclusion. In interpreting or applying that
right, consequently, it is essential to take into consideration the mean-
ing of that right under customary international law and under the
provision of the Charter, as well as the objective situation of the inter-
national community in general and the circumstances of the actual
case in particular. Like the concept of aggression, that of self-defence
is inherently difficult to define. With a rapidly changing society of
nations, the interpretation and application of the right of self-defence
in factual cases is not an easy task. It is, in the last analysis, a com-
petent organ of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature of the international
community which should be called on to carry out this task. In per-
forming this task, the various factors and criteria discussed above
should be taken into consideration.
72 See the statement of the representative of the Netherlands, G.A.O.R., (IX) (1954),
Sixth Comm., 410th Mtg., Para. 37; for the statement of the representative of China,
who was the strongest supporter of this Western view, see id., 409th Mtg., Paras. 6-13,
especially at 10; for the position of the United Kingdom, see G.A.O.R., (VI) (1951),
Sixth Comm., 281st Mtg., Para. 9.
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